Manas Pal
The normative expectations that come from the ‘Armed Forces
Special Power Act’ or AFSPA, which is always recognised by a common adjective
‘draconian’- have always, caused social aversion. The aversion can even reach
to an apogee in the form of Sharmila Irom. The social antipathy in regards to
the AFSPA is well understood for the fact that there are many elements in the
act that seek to curtail to a great extent the individual and collective rights
of the people as envisaged in the democratic system. So, recently when the
Tripura Government withdrew the AFSPA after about 18 years the decision was
hailed by all. The state government maintained that since peace had returned
and there was no immediate threat of any precipitating events that might lead
to serious militancy revival the Act then must go.
Even the oppositions Congress and BJP felt that at least this time the ‘Left was right’.
There was, however, a small section from the main opposition Congress in the state who held on their argument that the decision was ‘politically’ inspired in the wake of Left Front’s unsettling experience in the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council elections held on May 4 last. The Left Front in Tripura survives largely on the tribal votes. But this time, notwithstanding the fact that the Front was in the helm of ADC, its electoral base showed a worrying reduction of nine percent as compared to that of 2010 elections. This nine percent vote left the Left either in favour of Indigenous People’s Front – which is, of late, trying to capture the imagination of the tribal population raising the sensitive slogan of ‘separate Twipraland’ to be curved out of ADC areas -or BJP, which is showing all signs of entering into Tripura’s traditional CPM-Congress bipolar politics in a doggedly determined way, mostly squeezing out in fights ridden Congress. The political observers or activists belonging to this section of raised-eyebrows argued that Manik Sarkar played the AFSPA card to arrest the ‘erosion’ of tribal support as they- the tribal people who were mostly put under the shadow of the Act- in general had all along been critical of the act.
The cabinet decision of the Manik Sarkar led government did not come as a surprise. The reasons for the AFSPA withdrawal derived from the ground realities and supportive environment were justified by all yardsticks. If Manik Sarkar scores a political point by eliminating the government’s ‘oppressive attitude’- the common notion which develops about the AFSPA whenever it is enforced and is often highly exaggerated–it was an additional for his kitty. One of the senior most police officers confirmed that the decision to lift the AFSPA had been taken before the ADC elections actually. But the government did not want to take any chance and felt it prudent to keep the act in force till the elections are over.
As far as AFSPA and the precipitants that led to its introduction in Tripura are concerned, the experience is wholly different than that of the other states of the North East India where the same act is in force, for many years. In fact, it was introduced in Assam’s Naga inhabited Naga Hills district in 1958, about three years before ‘Nagaland’ came into being. In Manipur AFSPA had all along been a matter of serious and, off and on, aggressive protest. The sense of victimhood among the common people was too palatable to miss.
In February 1997 when AFSPA was enforced in Tripura the state was bleeding white due to tribal militancy. But it was not only the relentless massacres, abductions and mindless violent onslaughts on the non-tribal in a structured form by two banned outfits All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) that forced the Marxists in the state to go for AFSPA. In fact, it was more of the threat of ethnic riots that showed all indications of spilling over across the state and thus reviving the memories of 1980’s black days, that unsettled the Left Front government headed by Tripura’s first tribal Chief Minister Dasarath Deb. Two important factors should be kept in mind : First in Tripura it was the militants belonging to minority community who were carrying out bloody offensives against majority unlike other North Eastern states. Second, the progressive shadow of mass violence incited, facilitated and often actively supported by the non-state armed actors following almost every militant attack was in a sense unique and Tripura specific. In other North Eastern states the militant attacks were more or less confined to targeting security forces, police and other agencies that represented the Indian government and not the unarmed innocent villagers. Unlike Tripura there was rarely participation of active mob in manslaughter along with the militants- only to trigger intense retaliation from the other side as a spontaneous but deadly fall out.
The second phase of full scale militancy erupted in Tripura around 1993 spearheaded by ATTF and NLFT. Both the groups managed to tie up with other NE out fits for supports and establish safe havens in neighbouring Bangladesh. From across the Indo-Bangla border the killer squads would sneak into Tripura and carry out large scale massacres. Targets were inevitably Bengalis in villages close to foothills of Atharamura, Baramura , Langtarai and other hill ranges. The group would slip back to Bangladesh after the pogrom committed with impunity through highly porous border. By late 1990s they had turned militancy into a business enterprise with kidnapping rate touching 2/3 a day. The financial lure accompanied by aggressive xenophobic rhetoric helped them form fringe groups from the tribal villages. These fringe elements would help the militants as scouts and often took active part in killings and kidnappings in exchange of part of ransom money extorted from the hostage families. The most affected area remained Khowai, Kalyanpur, Teliamura, Takarjala and Sidhai police station areas-all in West Tripura district.
These areas in 1996 witnessed murders and mayhem in massive scales and with extreme brutality. All the state instruments of public order and protection appeared miserably incapable in meeting the situation.
On December 13-14 1996 a gang of ATTF led by Chitta Debbarma attacked Bazar Colony village by the side of Agartala- Khowai road in which 25 persons were killed including children and women, 18 were seriously injured , all houses were burn down. BJP leader L K Advani visited the colony next day. The attack was followed by sporadic at attacks by a combination of militants and their fringe group- not only in Khowai but also in other parts of the West Tripura district. The shadow of ethnic riot deepened menacingly.
On February 6, 1997 a large crowd of non tribals from Ramchandraghat, Chhebri, Moharcherra etc led by Amara Bangali gathered in front of the office of Khowai SDO Abhinoy Halam on a deputation seeking immediate release of a Bengali trader who had been kidnapped by ATTF. During deputation violence broke out and police had to open fire. That lit the wild reactions. The mob dispersed but on their way back killed a tribal youth and seriously wounded a tribal mechanical engineer – Utpal Debbarma who later became a top leader of NLFT. He became their intelligence chief and also held some important position and went by the name 'Umthai'.. On that evening Bengali mob killed four innocent tribal and injured six others. The die was cast. The ATTF and angry villagers retaliated time and again. On February 10 they attacked Rajnagar-Chandranath Thakur para and burnt down the entire village. Villagers could escape but one 92-years old Anandomoyee devi could not and she was picked up from her bed and then thrown to burning huts alive. Soon tribal rioters attacked Bengali dominated areas- Laltilla, Athaibari like small hamlets in Ramchandraghat areas in which four Bengalis were killed.
Despite ferocities of the attacks casualty were comparatively less because unlike Bazaar Colony in these places due to already prevailing lull the villagers had enough time to flee.
A refugee camp at Gaurangatilla by the Agartala Khowai road side was attacked in broad daylight where 14 were killed. On February 10- 15 several villages went up in flames with body count hovering around 30 or more.
Government replaced the incumbent West District SP and brought Amitabha Kar, known as a tough cop who led his troops and got engaged in encounters. In one such incident police shot dead a rioter. But still, the palpable threat of ethnic riot spilling over in other parts of the state hung heavily. A wholesome eruption of communal violence seemed imminent.
On February 15 mid night the state government promulgated Disturbed Area and enforced AFSPA -first in five police station areas (out of total 42) that included whole of Khowai and Kalyanpur PS and parts of Teliamura, Takarjala and Sidhai PS. Later the DA and as its natural corollary AFSPA were extended in 26 police station areas –some in full, some in parts. Among the police station areas Khowai, Kalyanpur, Sidhai and parts of Teliamura were ATTF stronghold while NLFT held sway in Takarjala and parts of Teliamura.
Soon after the DA promulgation Indian Army’s 14 Maratha Light Infantry were pressed into action for a brief period while the 21 sector Assam Rifles (under Army’s 3 Corps) , CRPF , BSF and elite Tripura State Rifles fanned out to contain the situation. The DA and accompanying AFSPA succeeded in containing the situation effectively- at least the threat of communal violence - though militancy continued for some more years with full fury.
It was after the Left Front suffered serious poll debacle and failed to prevent the NLFT from wholesome rigging of the ADC elections in May 2000 that Manik Sarkar government decided to take the bulls by horns. So far, the Left Front, despite DA and AFSPA in force, continued soft pedalling on the militancy issue with appeals and declaring financial sops to bring back the militants to mainstream. But after 2000 ADC elections rout virtually under the militants’ gun, several proactive Counter Insurgency strategies were put in place in to tackle the situation in an effective and decisive manner.
Coupled with determined CI strategies many other factors, like barbed wire fencing, increased TSR strength, introduction of village armed guards, modernization of Tripura police, Dhaka’s positive approach in flushing out Indian militants from her soil, economic uplift of the tribal due to massive rubber plantation, improvement of communications and strengthening of policing etc, introduction of mobile phones also helped the government to destroy the militant outfits and bring about peace in the next few years. ( There are many other factors for the return of peace in Tripura which need to be discussed separately : MP).
Now, the ATTF is a nonexistent group with its head Ranjit Debbarma in jail. According to latest report the strength of NLFT after series of surrenders of its top echelon, elimination of lower level cadres and effective destruction of its infrastructure, now stands at 80 and that too they are on the run and not at all in a position create a serious threat. In fact, they are now trying to surrender, as the report goes.
As the peace has returned there was no reason to keep any police station under the DA. Besides when DA was promulgated in there were only 42 police stations in the state spread across four districts. Now there are 74 police stations in eight districts. And as the government decided to free the 26 police station areas of DA the withdrawal of AFSPA was a natural outcome.
What is, however, most important and unique is that unlike other NE states, despite the ASPA was in force and, notwithstanding the fact many senior officers including 14 MLI’s Major Santosh Prabhakar were martyred in the counter insurgency operations, there was virtually no allegations against the armed forces deployed in the state of Human Rights violation.
( This article has been published in The Eclectic- North East magazine published from Guwahati recently as Special Story) .END
Even the oppositions Congress and BJP felt that at least this time the ‘Left was right’.
There was, however, a small section from the main opposition Congress in the state who held on their argument that the decision was ‘politically’ inspired in the wake of Left Front’s unsettling experience in the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council elections held on May 4 last. The Left Front in Tripura survives largely on the tribal votes. But this time, notwithstanding the fact that the Front was in the helm of ADC, its electoral base showed a worrying reduction of nine percent as compared to that of 2010 elections. This nine percent vote left the Left either in favour of Indigenous People’s Front – which is, of late, trying to capture the imagination of the tribal population raising the sensitive slogan of ‘separate Twipraland’ to be curved out of ADC areas -or BJP, which is showing all signs of entering into Tripura’s traditional CPM-Congress bipolar politics in a doggedly determined way, mostly squeezing out in fights ridden Congress. The political observers or activists belonging to this section of raised-eyebrows argued that Manik Sarkar played the AFSPA card to arrest the ‘erosion’ of tribal support as they- the tribal people who were mostly put under the shadow of the Act- in general had all along been critical of the act.
The cabinet decision of the Manik Sarkar led government did not come as a surprise. The reasons for the AFSPA withdrawal derived from the ground realities and supportive environment were justified by all yardsticks. If Manik Sarkar scores a political point by eliminating the government’s ‘oppressive attitude’- the common notion which develops about the AFSPA whenever it is enforced and is often highly exaggerated–it was an additional for his kitty. One of the senior most police officers confirmed that the decision to lift the AFSPA had been taken before the ADC elections actually. But the government did not want to take any chance and felt it prudent to keep the act in force till the elections are over.
As far as AFSPA and the precipitants that led to its introduction in Tripura are concerned, the experience is wholly different than that of the other states of the North East India where the same act is in force, for many years. In fact, it was introduced in Assam’s Naga inhabited Naga Hills district in 1958, about three years before ‘Nagaland’ came into being. In Manipur AFSPA had all along been a matter of serious and, off and on, aggressive protest. The sense of victimhood among the common people was too palatable to miss.
In February 1997 when AFSPA was enforced in Tripura the state was bleeding white due to tribal militancy. But it was not only the relentless massacres, abductions and mindless violent onslaughts on the non-tribal in a structured form by two banned outfits All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) that forced the Marxists in the state to go for AFSPA. In fact, it was more of the threat of ethnic riots that showed all indications of spilling over across the state and thus reviving the memories of 1980’s black days, that unsettled the Left Front government headed by Tripura’s first tribal Chief Minister Dasarath Deb. Two important factors should be kept in mind : First in Tripura it was the militants belonging to minority community who were carrying out bloody offensives against majority unlike other North Eastern states. Second, the progressive shadow of mass violence incited, facilitated and often actively supported by the non-state armed actors following almost every militant attack was in a sense unique and Tripura specific. In other North Eastern states the militant attacks were more or less confined to targeting security forces, police and other agencies that represented the Indian government and not the unarmed innocent villagers. Unlike Tripura there was rarely participation of active mob in manslaughter along with the militants- only to trigger intense retaliation from the other side as a spontaneous but deadly fall out.
The second phase of full scale militancy erupted in Tripura around 1993 spearheaded by ATTF and NLFT. Both the groups managed to tie up with other NE out fits for supports and establish safe havens in neighbouring Bangladesh. From across the Indo-Bangla border the killer squads would sneak into Tripura and carry out large scale massacres. Targets were inevitably Bengalis in villages close to foothills of Atharamura, Baramura , Langtarai and other hill ranges. The group would slip back to Bangladesh after the pogrom committed with impunity through highly porous border. By late 1990s they had turned militancy into a business enterprise with kidnapping rate touching 2/3 a day. The financial lure accompanied by aggressive xenophobic rhetoric helped them form fringe groups from the tribal villages. These fringe elements would help the militants as scouts and often took active part in killings and kidnappings in exchange of part of ransom money extorted from the hostage families. The most affected area remained Khowai, Kalyanpur, Teliamura, Takarjala and Sidhai police station areas-all in West Tripura district.
These areas in 1996 witnessed murders and mayhem in massive scales and with extreme brutality. All the state instruments of public order and protection appeared miserably incapable in meeting the situation.
On December 13-14 1996 a gang of ATTF led by Chitta Debbarma attacked Bazar Colony village by the side of Agartala- Khowai road in which 25 persons were killed including children and women, 18 were seriously injured , all houses were burn down. BJP leader L K Advani visited the colony next day. The attack was followed by sporadic at attacks by a combination of militants and their fringe group- not only in Khowai but also in other parts of the West Tripura district. The shadow of ethnic riot deepened menacingly.
On February 6, 1997 a large crowd of non tribals from Ramchandraghat, Chhebri, Moharcherra etc led by Amara Bangali gathered in front of the office of Khowai SDO Abhinoy Halam on a deputation seeking immediate release of a Bengali trader who had been kidnapped by ATTF. During deputation violence broke out and police had to open fire. That lit the wild reactions. The mob dispersed but on their way back killed a tribal youth and seriously wounded a tribal mechanical engineer – Utpal Debbarma who later became a top leader of NLFT. He became their intelligence chief and also held some important position and went by the name 'Umthai'.. On that evening Bengali mob killed four innocent tribal and injured six others. The die was cast. The ATTF and angry villagers retaliated time and again. On February 10 they attacked Rajnagar-Chandranath Thakur para and burnt down the entire village. Villagers could escape but one 92-years old Anandomoyee devi could not and she was picked up from her bed and then thrown to burning huts alive. Soon tribal rioters attacked Bengali dominated areas- Laltilla, Athaibari like small hamlets in Ramchandraghat areas in which four Bengalis were killed.
Despite ferocities of the attacks casualty were comparatively less because unlike Bazaar Colony in these places due to already prevailing lull the villagers had enough time to flee.
A refugee camp at Gaurangatilla by the Agartala Khowai road side was attacked in broad daylight where 14 were killed. On February 10- 15 several villages went up in flames with body count hovering around 30 or more.
Government replaced the incumbent West District SP and brought Amitabha Kar, known as a tough cop who led his troops and got engaged in encounters. In one such incident police shot dead a rioter. But still, the palpable threat of ethnic riot spilling over in other parts of the state hung heavily. A wholesome eruption of communal violence seemed imminent.
On February 15 mid night the state government promulgated Disturbed Area and enforced AFSPA -first in five police station areas (out of total 42) that included whole of Khowai and Kalyanpur PS and parts of Teliamura, Takarjala and Sidhai PS. Later the DA and as its natural corollary AFSPA were extended in 26 police station areas –some in full, some in parts. Among the police station areas Khowai, Kalyanpur, Sidhai and parts of Teliamura were ATTF stronghold while NLFT held sway in Takarjala and parts of Teliamura.
Soon after the DA promulgation Indian Army’s 14 Maratha Light Infantry were pressed into action for a brief period while the 21 sector Assam Rifles (under Army’s 3 Corps) , CRPF , BSF and elite Tripura State Rifles fanned out to contain the situation. The DA and accompanying AFSPA succeeded in containing the situation effectively- at least the threat of communal violence - though militancy continued for some more years with full fury.
It was after the Left Front suffered serious poll debacle and failed to prevent the NLFT from wholesome rigging of the ADC elections in May 2000 that Manik Sarkar government decided to take the bulls by horns. So far, the Left Front, despite DA and AFSPA in force, continued soft pedalling on the militancy issue with appeals and declaring financial sops to bring back the militants to mainstream. But after 2000 ADC elections rout virtually under the militants’ gun, several proactive Counter Insurgency strategies were put in place in to tackle the situation in an effective and decisive manner.
Coupled with determined CI strategies many other factors, like barbed wire fencing, increased TSR strength, introduction of village armed guards, modernization of Tripura police, Dhaka’s positive approach in flushing out Indian militants from her soil, economic uplift of the tribal due to massive rubber plantation, improvement of communications and strengthening of policing etc, introduction of mobile phones also helped the government to destroy the militant outfits and bring about peace in the next few years. ( There are many other factors for the return of peace in Tripura which need to be discussed separately : MP).
Now, the ATTF is a nonexistent group with its head Ranjit Debbarma in jail. According to latest report the strength of NLFT after series of surrenders of its top echelon, elimination of lower level cadres and effective destruction of its infrastructure, now stands at 80 and that too they are on the run and not at all in a position create a serious threat. In fact, they are now trying to surrender, as the report goes.
As the peace has returned there was no reason to keep any police station under the DA. Besides when DA was promulgated in there were only 42 police stations in the state spread across four districts. Now there are 74 police stations in eight districts. And as the government decided to free the 26 police station areas of DA the withdrawal of AFSPA was a natural outcome.
What is, however, most important and unique is that unlike other NE states, despite the ASPA was in force and, notwithstanding the fact many senior officers including 14 MLI’s Major Santosh Prabhakar were martyred in the counter insurgency operations, there was virtually no allegations against the armed forces deployed in the state of Human Rights violation.
( This article has been published in The Eclectic- North East magazine published from Guwahati recently as Special Story) .END
Very factual. Objective.
ReplyDeleteI wrote a post on withdrawal of AFSPA but that wasn't detailed like your post. In fact, my post was rather about the meaningless opposition to the withdrawal of AFSPA. Love your post.
Thank you dada. You were the witness and the top man in the field during those days. Your comment/ appreciation makes it different, indeed.
DeleteNice report, what remains unanswered is the steps taken by state Govt. to make things smooth .
ReplyDeleteThank you very much. Regards
ReplyDeleteThe Informations, Presentation & Compilation are in a perfect blending, a matter of pleasure for the reader & at the same time learning for the next generation of the State of Tripura.
ReplyDeleteThanks Sauvik. .For kind words
ReplyDeleteKaku, most probably you inadvertently missed one specific information. AFSPA is actually a British legacy. To be precise, AFSPA was promulgated as Armed Forces (Special Powers) Ordinance on 15th August, 1942 by the then Viceroy and Governor General of India, Lord Linlithgow to crush the Quit India Movement. It was later re-introduced in the Indian Parliament on August 11, 1958 by then Home Minister Govind Ballabh Pant. The rest you know. And otherwise, your write-up is superb as always.
ReplyDeleteI did not inadvertantly miss it. I am well aware of how and when and why it was introduced in India. But my subject was not history of AFSPA.
DeleteGreat post with great information.
ReplyDeleteThank you Bobita
ReplyDelete