NLFT WANTS ZORAMTHANGA, HRANGKHWAL FOR FINAL TALKS

 Manas Pal

Stage is all set for final peace talks with the National Liberation front of Tripura (NLFT) –Biswamohan militants.  

If everything goes in right direction and smoothly the NLFT leaders will sit on a discussion table with the central and state government officials for the final discussion within a very short time. Papers relating to the peace talks have been finalized today (11 August, 2015). The entire process for the peace talks is being handled, according to sources in the government, by the Intelligence Bureau (IB) at the instance of New Delhi in cordination  with Tripura Police and Tripura Tribal Welfare Department.

Senior official sources said, already two meetings with the NLFT militants were held –one in Shillong and one in New Delhi – on April 2 and May 2 last. In the meetings IB officials and senior Tripura Police Officials as well as Tripura Tribal Welfare department officials were present. Now the ‘modalities’ and ‘frameworks’ are being finalized. Everything is fecilitated by the IB in association with the Tribal Welfare Department.

Interesting it may sound that the NLFT has among others also demanded that former Mizoram Chief Minister Zoramthanga and former TNV leader, now INPT president Bijoy Hrangkhwal to be included in the peace talks as interlocutors. NLFT  has sent a letter to the Home Ministry recently in this regard. It is not, however, clear whether the government has agreed to the demand but sources said both Zoramthanga and Hrangkhwal are kept aware of the developments.

The NLFT with a reduced strength of mere 80 ( or 90) was neither at all in a position to revive militancy considering the present situation of the state, nor in a position to bargain hard with the government. Their other demands, except that of Zoramthanga – who, according to them, played a great role in bringing other underground organizations to talks, - and Hrangkhwal, included ‘suspension of operations’ against them like it was in the case of NSCN –IM. They also asked assurance for the ‘proper rehabilitation’ of the NLFT militants who had already surrendered in the past.

The State government side pressed that NLFT must stop all their violent activities and there should be no extortion or recruitment. The government assured that the militants would be given North East surrender packages whoever would fit for that.

The NLFT –which still carries the tag of its president Biswamohan Debbarma a ka D Baithang- is actually now being led by Sachindra Debbarma, a militants who deserted All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF-now defunct) some five years ago from Satcherri, Bangladesh.

Biswamohan Debbarma the first generation NLFT leader, according to sources, does not carry much weight in the organization now. In fact , in one meeting Sachindra Debbarma who runs the organization de fecto  was present while NLFT’s self styled foreign secretary Utpal Debbarma alias Umthang attended both the meetings, ostensibly for the fact that the engineer-turned militants is fluent in English and well versed about the nitty-gritty of such a dealing. However, the NLFT letter to Home Ministrt demanding Zoramthanga and Hrankhwal’s inclusion in the peace talks was signed by K Reang who is actually Upendra Reang, son of senior CPM leader Binduram Reang. Upendra had left the home and joined the NLFT about 15 years ago. He is now reportedly operating in Northern Tripura side with a small band of NLFT militants.

At the face of it the peace talks seems to be a usual development. But what may appear surprising, if not intriguing, is the involvement and alacrity of the central intelligence agencies. NLFT could be last choice for any such peace talks, given its present condition.

Whatever the outcome of the talks may ultimately appear, anticipation of a larger fall out , politically speaking, of any such initiative where names like Zoramthanga and Hrangkhwal are being uttered cannot be ruled out altogether – at least in relation to recent demand of the “Twipraland”  to be curved out of Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council Areas. There are reportedly some initiatives are on for merger of IPFT and INPT for a greater cause.

Only on August 4 last the Mizos of Jampui hills of North Tripura staged demonstration demanding that they now be always and officially as well be called ‘Mizo’ , not by the popular and common nomenclature ‘Lushai’. It should also not be missed out that some of the Mizo National Front leaders in the past openly subscribed to the idea of merger of Tripura’s Mizo dominated Jampui Hills with Mizoram.  At the face of it the demand may look very innocuous and innocent, but a deep look at the developments it generates an uncomfortable feeling—it is as if  not all that meets the eye.

NLFT had suffered two splits since its inception in 1990 with former TNV vice president Dhananjay Reang.  Dhananjay who as NLFT’s first president led a daredevil attack in Tainani Police station in South Tripura on December 11 , 1991 with  seven cadres –all except one Nitya Debbarma- belonging to his own tribe ‘Reang’- was two years later ousted in a coup by Tripuri militants led by Biswamohan Debbarma , Kamini Debbarma et al on the pretext of financial irregularities, murders and womanising in December 1993.

Dhanajay claimed that the Tripuri militants- belonging to the largest tribal community of the state- were not ready to accept leadership of a Reang (Bru)– belonging to the second largest and only primitive community of the state and that is why the coup was organized. Dhananjay had been outnumbered and he had to flee with his followers, mostly Reangs and formed his own outfit Tripura Resurrection Army which once even sought to forge alliance with the ATTF led by Ranjit Debbarma an arch rival of NLFT. But the TRA could not sustain and under pressure –both from the security forces and from the NLFT surrendered to the government en masse with 113 militants in April 1997. Now Dhananjay lives in a pathetic conditiomn. 

Second split the NLFT suffered when Nayanbasi Jamatia a staunch Christian and slightly eccentric,  was forced to leave the organization in October 2000 following meeting from 4-6 October. The split was a result of long drawn discontent on various issues, mostly financial irregularities and some specific murders of underground cadres by the Biswamohan-Kamini group. Nayanbasi and his followers like Janbir Debbarma et al somehow managed to escape from murderous attacks from NLFT Biswamohan group at last on Februray 12, 2001  formed his own group NLFT- Nayanbasi with 137 cadres ( Mlater 45 more joined).

After a series of bloody engagements and killings by both sides NLFT- Nayanbasi group surrendered en masse - except Nayanbasi himself -on December 25, 2004 following negotiations with centre – L K Advani , the Tripura police – DGP G M Srivastava and Tribal Welfare Department- Secretary GSG Ayyengar ( April 10, 2004). Nayanbasi who first came over ground but then went one more time underground was held by Bangladesh agencies in jail. He was later released by Bangladeshi authorities and then arrested by Tripura police.  He is now seriously ill.

In the meantime, the main group who went strong despite splits –NLFT Biswaamohan also faced serious setback- almost a split when its all top leaders including (self styled) Vice president Kamini Debbarma, general secretary Mantu Koloy, finance secretary Bishnuprasad Jamatia a ka J Bosong, assistant finance secretary Dhanu Koloy , chief of army staff Binoy Debbarma, deputy chief of army Sanjit Debbarma along with other surrendered before the Governor DN Sahaya on May 6, 2004. Altogether 72 militants including 22 females – many of them were fake and most the females were simply spouses or lovers of the militants.

Fake or genuine the militants, this was a brilliant police operation which left the NLFT-Biswamohan group truncated. Those top guns who surrendered were already old enough to run a militant organization and it was reported that they had been given the option to leave the organization. The surrender was done to help them get the NE Surrender Package.

This surrender coupled with many other factors –displacement of huge Bengali population from the remote areas who had been their prime target,  barbed wire fencing along Indo-Bangla border severely preventing their movements from across the border, proactive counter insurgency operations, improved communication network , wholesome police modernization, introduction of armed village guards ( SPOs), massive inflow of rubber money, offensives of Bangladesh authorities on their camps in their territory etc – served a severe blow to the NLFT Biswamohan which despite several attempts failed to revive its strength. The NLFT’s strength kept on reducing and its movement and activities died out, virtually. In some remote pockets they off and on carried  out some extortion etc but mostly remained holed up in the bases silently in deep interior of Sajek range in Chittagong Hill Tracts –Bangladesh.

Only recently , the NLFT suffered yet another jolt when its first generation leader Atharababu Halam, and two young militants Wathai Debbarma and Keating Debbarma surrendered before the DGP K Nagraj on May 9 with pistol, grenade and country made guns. This surrender evidently unsettled the NLFT which is now almost quarantined the militants leaders suspected to be prone to surrender. Atharababu Halam’s son in law Bankim Debbarma is one among them.

It is at this juncture the central government’s initiative to bring the NLFT –virtually a defunct organization and almost at the verge of natural death- to mainstream following peace talks, may be considered an interesting development.

WILL THE WEAPONS COME ?

Manas Pal

It is not the question that what were there in the recently signed Naga Accord - or what would be the modalities for final settlement of the accord -that makes me a bit uncomfortable. Recently R N Ravi who acted as the chief interlocutor assured that the agreement had not incorporated any point that would suggest any change in state boundaries in the region. The assurance would definitely allay the apprehension of the people of Manipur as well as Arunachal Pradesh that their state boundaries would not be compromised for bringing about peace in Nagaland.

What, however, I apprehend is that when everything will be finalized the government apparatus and, obviously the Naga rebel leaders who participated in the peace process, may face a serious problem in regard to disarming the NSCN -IM cadres.

After return of the peace following long drawn violent confrontations, conflicts and war- where non state cadres had taken active part- disarming the armed cadres had always been an arduous and complicated task.  For any armed and trained guerrilla cadre in any conflict zone who spent many years carrying his firearms 24 hours under the bare sky or in shady camps somewhere in deep forest or in mountain ranges facing the shadow of death from security forces or for that matter from rival groups, disarming would simply mean an amputation of a vital limb. They would not mind to eschew violence, but they would certainly find it impossible to discard their weapons, especially the personal holding.  The reassuring sense of security that emanates from the cold AK 47 or a .9 mm Pistol or sub machinegun would vanish as soon as the arms would be taken away. They would feel like standing naked in the open.  

In 1971-72 after creation of Bangladesh both the Indian army and also the Mukti Bahini commanders had a troubled time to disarm huge and happily wild Bengali guerrillas. It took a long time and carefully planned strategy to disarm the Bengali guerrillas.  

In my own state Tripura same had been the experience in several occasions in the past. In fact, in almost all the militant group surrenders the experience was the same- the militants did not lay down their fire arms. They kept them buried only to be used later.

Let me give an example .

On August 12, 1988  Tripura National Volunteers ( TNV) under the leadership of Bijoy Hrangkhwal  signed tripartite Accord and then surrendered en masse in remote Govinda bari . Altogether 437 TNV militants surrendered, they laid down only 64 firearms. Most of the fire arms – which were not deposited --were later dug out from their hidden places and used by NLFT which was virtually an off shoot of the TNV.

In April, 1993 after the return of the Left Front government under Dasarath Deb, All Tripura Tribal Force  on September 6, 1993 surrendered at Shikaribari following a bipartite accord. A total of 1635 militants surrendered –most of them were fake – and they placed before the authorities some .303 rifles. Since the outfit got split at that time, most of the arms remained with the cadres loyal to Ranjit Debarma who spearheaded the new group under the new nomenclature ‘All Tripura Tiger Force’. Now, after two decades of brutal militancy ATTF is defunct and Ranjit is arrested. None knows where had the massive cache of weapons – those including AKs, LMGs, RPG launchers etc , gone.  We often came across some reports from Bangladesh that said RAB found out huge weaponry in the deep jungles of Satcherri areas which had once been the base camp of the All Tripura Tiger Force. Same story went with the small groups like Tripura Resurrection Army  or NLFT –Nayanbasi .

The disarming task of the NSCN-IM cadres is likely to be an extremely difficult task for many reasons. By nature Nagas are warriors and like any martial race weapons are virtually a part of their life. Besides, the Naga  problem is the oldest militancy problem in the South East Asia and the guerrillas were for many decades got accustomed to carry their weapons – ceasefire or no ceasefire- sometimes openly , sometimes in a not-so-concealed manner. Some of the weapons were actually handed down to them from the ‘elders’--the past generation guerrillas.

Apart from their emotional attachment with the firearms, there are some practical problems also for the cadres ready to come over ground.

NSCN-IM is not the only Naga rebel outfit in the region. There are many other outfits like their arch rival NSCN Khaplang, NSCN Kitovi etc and also some ethnic Naga groups formed by Zeliang Nagas ( mostly from Tamenglong and adjoining areas of Manipur). NSCN-IM rebels had been often engaged in bloody and fierce shoot outs and killings with them. Disarmed NSCN IM cadres would genuinely face mortal threat from the other groups- all of them had already rejected the August 3 peace accord.

While it is expected that senior leaders of NSCN- I M will be allowed to carry their personal weapons and will also, perhaps, get security cover from the State as well as from their own personnel, for the lower level cadres disarming will undoubtedly cause a seriously insecure situation. In this sense several selective killings for revenge and elimination at local level for strategic reasons by the rival groups could not be ruled out altogether.

Of course, the government and the NSCN –IM top brass have given due thought to the problem and are expected to come out with a well planned strategy to overcome it. But keeping in mind the reported NSCN-IM strength of about 6000 guerrillas, it is to be seen how much weaponry can really be brought over ground. Even if one wants to set aside the NSCN-IM’s ‘institutional’ arms cache – the sheer personnel strength means 6000 personal firearms. One way can be the straight and wholesome military intervention for the disarming task in the nine designated camps where the guerrillas has been staying since ceasefire instead of expecting a formal lay down ceremony as it happened  in other cases.  Just imagine even if a small part of the weapons of the 6000 plus NSCN –IM cadres stays back in the underground, it would inevitably mean one more problem for future. After all firearms have a tendency to open up with slightest provocation. Any cadre who would not deposit his fire arms would mean a virtual free lancer ready for adventures, and well, misadventures too.
---------------------------
Post Script : Most of the NSCN IM arms are sophisticated and supllied by China and bought from open sources i.e arms smugllers. If you remember massive arms haul in Chittagong Port -- a large part of the arms were meant for the NSCN IM. They also used to sell/ supply the arms to other outfits like NLFT in Tripura. Many arms were also brought and sold to them from the Khmer Rouge. According to reports the LTTE had also shared weapons with the NSCN IM . Drugs is also reported to have played a key role in the arms procurement with an intenational network. END

ARMS AND THE WOMEN

Manas Pal

Fun in Underground. ( A Photo album of the NLFT-Biswamohan militants)

NLFT- Biswamohan group militants were always known for their special interest in women. Many of the Cupid Struck militants had deserted their camps and surrenderd with their spouses. Some of them were shot dead over traingular love affairs. Once even there was a fierce shoot out in Bangladesh hide out over girls. There were also large scale rape incidents - the infamous one being the Raiabari gang rape incident in Gomati district. The main accused of the incident Haflong was later shot dead by the police while reportedly trying to escape. 
Picture copyright : Manas Pal

ATLEAST, WHEN THE LEFT IS RIGHT

 Manas Pal

The normative expectations that come from the ‘Armed Forces Special Power Act’ or AFSPA, which is always recognised by a common adjective ‘draconian’- have always, caused social aversion. The aversion can even reach to an apogee in the form of Sharmila Irom. The social antipathy in regards to the AFSPA is well understood for the fact that there are many elements in the act that seek to curtail to a great extent the individual and collective rights of the people as envisaged in the democratic system. So, recently when the Tripura Government withdrew the AFSPA after about 18 years the decision was hailed by all. The state government maintained that since peace had returned and there was no immediate threat of any precipitating events that might lead to serious militancy revival the Act then must go.
Even the oppositions Congress and BJP felt that at least this time the ‘Left was right’.
There was, however, a small section from the main opposition Congress in the state who held on their argument that the decision was ‘politically’ inspired in the wake of Left Front’s unsettling experience in the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council elections held on May 4 last. The Left Front in Tripura survives largely on the tribal votes. But this time, notwithstanding the fact that the Front was in the helm of ADC, its electoral base showed a worrying reduction of nine percent as compared to that of 2010 elections. This nine percent vote left the Left either in favour of Indigenous People’s Front – which is, of late, trying to capture the imagination of the tribal population raising the sensitive slogan of ‘separate Twipraland’ to be curved out of ADC areas -or BJP, which is showing all signs of entering into Tripura’s traditional CPM-Congress bipolar politics in a doggedly determined way, mostly squeezing out in fights ridden Congress. The political observers or activists belonging to this section of raised-eyebrows argued that Manik Sarkar played the AFSPA card to arrest the ‘erosion’ of tribal support as they- the tribal people who were mostly put under the shadow of the Act- in general had all along been critical of the act.
The cabinet decision of the Manik Sarkar led government did not come as a surprise. The reasons for the AFSPA withdrawal derived from the ground realities and supportive environment were justified by all yardsticks. If Manik Sarkar scores a political point by eliminating the government’s ‘oppressive attitude’- the common notion which develops about the AFSPA whenever it is enforced and is often highly exaggerated–it was an additional for his kitty.  One of the senior most police officers confirmed that the decision to lift the AFSPA had been taken before the ADC elections actually. But the government did not want to take any chance and felt it prudent to keep the act in force till the elections are over.
As far as AFSPA and the precipitants that led to its introduction in Tripura are concerned, the experience is wholly different than that of the other states of the North East India where the same act is in force, for many years. In fact, it was introduced in Assam’s Naga inhabited Naga Hills district in 1958, about three years before ‘Nagaland’ came into being. In Manipur AFSPA had all along been a matter of serious and, off and on, aggressive protest. The sense of victimhood among the common people was too palatable to miss.
In February 1997 when AFSPA was enforced in Tripura the state was bleeding white due to tribal militancy. But it was not only the relentless massacres, abductions and mindless violent onslaughts on the non-tribal in a structured form by two banned outfits All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) that forced the Marxists in the state to go for AFSPA. In fact, it was more of the threat of ethnic riots that showed all indications of spilling over across the state and thus reviving the memories of 1980’s black days, that unsettled the Left Front government headed by Tripura’s first tribal Chief Minister Dasarath Deb. Two important factors should be kept in mind : First in Tripura it was the militants belonging to minority community who were carrying out bloody offensives against majority unlike other North Eastern states. Second, the progressive shadow of mass violence incited, facilitated and often actively supported by the non-state armed actors following almost every militant attack was in a sense unique and Tripura specific. In other North Eastern states the militant attacks were more or less confined to targeting security forces, police and other agencies that represented the Indian government and not the unarmed innocent villagers. Unlike Tripura there was rarely participation of active mob in manslaughter along with the militants- only to trigger intense retaliation from the other side as a spontaneous but deadly fall out.
The second phase of full scale militancy erupted in Tripura around 1993 spearheaded by ATTF and NLFT. Both the groups managed to tie up with other NE out fits for supports and establish safe havens in neighbouring Bangladesh. From across the Indo-Bangla border the killer squads would sneak into Tripura and carry out large scale massacres. Targets were inevitably Bengalis in villages close to foothills of Atharamura, Baramura , Langtarai and other hill ranges. The group would slip back to Bangladesh after the pogrom committed with impunity through highly porous border. By late 1990s they had turned militancy into a business enterprise with kidnapping rate touching 2/3 a day. The financial lure accompanied by aggressive xenophobic rhetoric helped them form fringe groups from the tribal villages. These fringe elements would help the militants as scouts and often took active part in killings and kidnappings in exchange of part of ransom money extorted from the hostage families.  The most affected area remained Khowai, Kalyanpur, Teliamura, Takarjala and Sidhai police station areas-all in West Tripura district.
These areas in 1996 witnessed murders and mayhem in massive scales and with extreme brutality. All the state instruments of public order and protection appeared miserably incapable in meeting the situation.
 On December 13-14 1996 a gang of ATTF led by Chitta Debbarma attacked Bazar Colony village by the side of Agartala- Khowai road in which 25 persons were killed including children and women, 18 were seriously injured , all houses were burn down.  BJP leader L K Advani visited the colony next day. The attack was followed by sporadic at attacks by a combination of militants and their fringe group- not only in Khowai but also in other parts of the West Tripura district. The shadow of ethnic riot deepened menacingly.
On February 6, 1997 a large crowd of non tribals from Ramchandraghat, Chhebri, Moharcherra etc led by Amara Bangali gathered in front of the office of Khowai SDO Abhinoy Halam on a deputation seeking immediate release of a Bengali trader who had been kidnapped by ATTF. During deputation violence broke out and police had to open fire. That lit the wild reactions. The mob dispersed but on their way back killed a tribal youth and seriously wounded a tribal mechanical engineer – Utpal Debbarma who later became a top leader of NLFT. He became their intelligence chief and also held some important position and went by the name 'Umthai'.. On that evening Bengali mob killed four innocent tribal and injured six others.  The die was cast. The ATTF and angry villagers retaliated time and again. On February 10 they attacked Rajnagar-Chandranath Thakur para  and burnt down the entire village. Villagers could escape but one 92-years old Anandomoyee devi could not and she was picked up from her bed and then thrown to burning huts alive. Soon tribal rioters attacked Bengali dominated areas- Laltilla, Athaibari like small hamlets in Ramchandraghat areas in which four Bengalis were killed.
Despite ferocities of the attacks casualty were comparatively less because unlike Bazaar Colony in these places due to already prevailing lull the villagers had enough time to flee.
 A refugee camp at Gaurangatilla by the Agartala Khowai road side was attacked in broad daylight where 14 were killed. On February 10- 15 several villages went up in flames with body count hovering around 30 or more.
Government replaced the incumbent West District SP and brought Amitabha Kar, known as a tough cop who led his troops and got engaged in encounters. In one such incident police shot dead a rioter. But still, the palpable threat of ethnic riot spilling over in other parts of the state hung heavily. A wholesome eruption of communal violence seemed imminent.
On February 15 mid night the state government promulgated Disturbed Area and enforced AFSPA -first in five police station areas (out of total 42) that included whole of Khowai and Kalyanpur PS and parts of Teliamura, Takarjala and Sidhai PS. Later the DA and as its natural corollary AFSPA were extended in 26  police station areas –some in full, some in parts. Among the police station areas Khowai, Kalyanpur,  Sidhai and parts of Teliamura were ATTF stronghold while NLFT held sway in Takarjala and parts of Teliamura.
Soon after the DA promulgation Indian Army’s 14 Maratha Light Infantry were pressed into action for a brief period while the 21 sector Assam Rifles (under Army’s 3 Corps) , CRPF , BSF and elite Tripura State Rifles fanned out to contain the situation. The DA and accompanying AFSPA succeeded in containing the situation effectively- at least the threat of communal violence - though militancy continued for some more years with full fury.
It was after the Left Front suffered serious poll debacle and failed to prevent the NLFT from wholesome rigging of the ADC elections in May 2000 that Manik Sarkar government decided to take the bulls by horns. So far, the Left Front, despite DA and AFSPA in force, continued soft pedalling on the militancy issue with appeals and declaring financial sops to bring back the militants to mainstream. But after 2000 ADC elections rout virtually under the militants’ gun, several proactive Counter Insurgency strategies were put in place in to tackle the situation in an effective and decisive manner.
Coupled with determined CI strategies many other factors, like barbed wire fencing, increased TSR strength, introduction of village armed guards, modernization of Tripura police, Dhaka’s positive approach in flushing out Indian militants from her soil, economic uplift of the tribal due to massive rubber plantation, improvement of communications and strengthening of policing etc, introduction of mobile phones also helped the government to destroy the militant outfits and bring about peace in the next few years. ( There are many other factors for the return of peace in Tripura which need to be discussed separately : MP).
Now, the ATTF is a nonexistent group with its head Ranjit Debbarma in jail. According to latest report the strength of NLFT  after series of surrenders of its top echelon, elimination of lower level cadres and effective destruction of its infrastructure,  now stands at 80 and that too they are on the run and not at all in a position create a serious threat. In fact, they are now trying to surrender, as the report goes.
As the peace has returned there was no reason to keep any police station under the DA. Besides when DA was promulgated in there were only 42 police stations in the state spread across four districts. Now there are 74 police stations in eight districts. And as the government decided to free the 26 police station areas of DA the withdrawal of  AFSPA was a natural outcome.
What is, however, most important and unique is that unlike other NE states, despite the ASPA was in force and, notwithstanding the fact many senior officers including 14 MLI’s Major Santosh Prabhakar were martyred in the counter insurgency operations, there was virtually no allegations against the armed forces deployed in the state of Human Rights violation. 
( This article has been published in The Eclectic-  North East magazine published from Guwahati recently as Special Story) .END

1. 
   

KILLING WITH A HUMANE FACE

( Reproduced. Written on August 4, 2010)

By Manas Paul

I have never killed a man, but I have read many obituaries with great pleasure." Clarence Darrow.

As a seminar on Human rights violations in Counter Insurgency Operations gets underway in Prajna Bhawan organized by Tripura Police and Institute of Social Science from today (August 4, 2010) where police officials at various ranks would be discussing one of the most convoluted yet most difficult tasks they face at field level operations, some points also need public appreciation.

Tripura being one of the three states after Mizoram and Punjab where peace returned after decades old armed conflicts is perhaps the right place for holding such a seminar on the important civil right issue. Because it is here that despite bloody engagements for years together the rate of Human Rights violations is extremely low- barring two glaring examples of Ujan Maidan in 1989 and Kutnabari in 1999. 

The title of the seminar ‘Human Rights in Counter Insurgency’ first needs clarification. Expectedly the seminar would not confine its deliberations to Tripura only but would dwell extensively with global and national perspectives at backdrop. 

But when the word ‘Insurgency’ is used one must keep in mind that in Tripura the armed violence committed by a section of tribal youths since early eighties never graduated to ‘Insurgency’ in its classical connotation. So, in Tripura perspective the title Human Rights in Counter Insurgency would be ‘misplaced’ if not altogether a misnomer.

There are clear parameters to define ‘insurgency’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘militancy’. And as such the task of maintaining Human Rights while dealing with various forms of violent insurrections or acts by non-state actors is shaped by different levels of personal and institutional understanding of the ground situations and restraints. 

The question of quantum of force while dealing with the non-state armed actors in field level, especially when it calls for an instantaneous decision, is, indeed, a difficult task for men in uniform. That it poses real dilemma for the security and police officials and personnel was clearly stated by none other than the Chief Justice of Gauhati High Court M B Lokur himself in his key note address in the inaugural session of the seminar. The CJ did neither delve deep into the dilemma nor did he touch upon the various forms of armed violence. 

But Human Rights issue is, perhaps, the most important factor in any conflict zone and in dealing with non-state armed actors due to such ‘dilemma’ security personnel or policemen can end up in taking wrong decision resulting in blatant infringement of human rights. The basic idea of Human Rights warrants that it cannot even be denied to the people even if they are engaged in posing serious threat to human life and dignity and civil security in general. In this context it is imperative that we should understand the different meanings and characters of the ‘insurgency’, 'terrorism’ and 'militancy' at first and inherent problems-dilemma- that might come in taking strategic as well as instantaneous decisions for combating the menace. 

For example, the reflex and reactions of the security forces or police acting against a Maoist rebel ready to fight the representatives of the ‘oppressive Indian state’ will definitely be, and expected to be, different than his reactions against a Jihadi or Fidayen terrorist from Pakistan or some Afghan mountain who, armed with explosive vests and AKs, is set to indiscriminate manslaughter and kill as many innocents as possible before blowing himself up to his heaven and hurries. Practically, the same security man or police will have different sets of restraint levels and thus at the end different explanations of sacredness of Human Rights.

Coming back to the connotations of armed violence, ‘insurgency’ has been characterised by several parameters. Among them five important factors are:

It is an armed violence committed by a disgruntled section of the society that was till recently been an integral part of the system.

Guided by ideological or strong ethno-centric motivation, they take up arms to fight against the power that be, alien powers included.

They should have a clear, well defined political and armed command structure and hierarchy. The political commander can also function as the armed commander at local, zonal or regional level. 

They should have some popular support at local level as well as in other sections of the society like intelligentsia, NGOs and pressure groups..

And they should have a liberated zone that they seek to expand continuously- with constant engagements with the state power that be for strengthening their own 'Mass Control Mechanism ' reducing that of the government- among others until they capture state power or secede from the homogenous land or drive out others from it

In that sense Maoists in India and Nepal very well fit in the category. 

Terrorism - is certainly a broad and all encompassing word that remains in use since the time of Jacobean period of France. In fact from the time of Robespierre there were hundreds of people Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot to Rwandan or Yugoslavian characters who had resorted to terror tactics to eliminate whomever they felt were in opposition. But, of late, terrorism in Indian context is used to Jihadi terrorism abetted, aided and exported to India from Pakistan. The terrorism of Jihadi kind can be determined by some obvious factors. Broadly they are:

They do not have any clear cut political and armed hierarchy. Al Qaeda is actually a ‘Base’ and it formed the International Islamic Front (IIF) in 1998 with several member organizations. The IIF members or for that matter non-member Islamic Jihadi outfits were free to operate and launch terror campaign on their own at their local levels and were also allowed to transport their terrorists to any other country to commit operations. 

Jihadi terrorists are guided by staunch Wahabi Islamic ideology to create a Dar-ul-Islam (Islamic world) which is not limited to any political boundary of a nation state or country. They are not disgruntled group but brainwashed and indoctrinated zombies picked up from backwater localities as well as from important universities. They come from all possible strata of life - Osama Bin Laden from Wealthy Arabian family, an Egyptian doctor Ayman Al Zwahari, an educated engineer in the name of Mohammed Atta from Germany, to a Taliban from rustic Afghan or SWAT province in Pakistan or Sudan.

Their sworn enemies are infidels belonging to non - Islamic faiths like the Jews, Christians, Hindus etc. But in their operations they do not target - like insurgents- specifically but prefer to kill by way of mercenary attacks or bomb explosions or by any violent means as many as possible to undermine the governments run or influenced by infidels.

They, however, are not inclined to capture political power

And their operations are neither confined to any specific areas or boundary and nor there is any scope for any peace negotiations with them.

On the other hand the militancy is characterized by violent activities committed by a group of disgruntled people who feel that they should have their own areas of self determination and rule in their ethno centric homogenous political area. The broad characteristics of the militants are :

Militants function in particular areas of their influence 

They mainly target-like insurgents, representatives of the government in power

But unlike insurgents they are neither guided by any motivation to capture the state power in the entire country and put in place a particular ideologically guided government 

More often their fight-due to their ethno-centric characters- ultimately boils down to communal confrontations and the targeted victims become their immediate neighbours outside their own ethnic community.

There is always scope for peace and political negotiations with them and arrival at a long lasting settlement. And as such militants who once carried out armed violence can very well be absorbed in the society and be allowed to participate in overall development activities.

Considering all these characters North East India’s armed organizations are by and large militants. It is true that some of the North east militants speak of ‘Socialism’ (NSCN) and communism ( Meitei outfits like Kangleipak Communist party or the UNLF-an offshoot of Red Guards led by Hijam Irabot) but in all practical purposes there is no effective influence of their declared ‘Socialist’ or ‘Communist’ values.

As far as Tripura is concerned the violence committed by the armed outfits right from TNV, ATPLO, to NLFT, ATTF was never in true sense ‘insurgency’. The armed outfits of Tripura did never have four important characteristics of insurgency i.e popular support, a liberated zone, well defined and highly motivated politico-armed command structures and ideological and political motivations. They are virtually a blend of criminal elements led by some unscrupulous greedy people and are fuelled by strong communal hatred for their neighbours. Their leaders talked to freeing Tripura from the clutch of ‘Hindu Bengalis’ who outnumbered the tribals following partition and resultant influx from erstwhile East Pakistan, committed brutalities in all imaginable forms on the unarmed civilians including their own people and in the process made huge money and started business in foreign countries. The leaders who wanted to become ‘President’ of sovereign Tripura and indulged in violence and man slaughters ultimately find it was more rewarding to become a ‘chairman’ of a government run corporation. 

So, despite popular usages in battle strategies formulated by the state as well as in media reports- the ‘Counter Insurgency’ would be a 'misnomer' as far as Tripura is concerned.

Yet, coming back to Human Rights in Counter Insurgency campaign, it is beyond any question that the engagements between the state force and non-state armed actors are inherently fraught with threat of Human Rights violations, as instantaneous decisions by the force in uniform could very well go astray in a conflict zone. The militants do neither care for Human Rights nor are ready to practice it in any form. In reality ultimate success or sporadic achievements of their policies and operations are based exclusively on Human Rights violations only.

In India we can safely say state authority succeeded in combating and containing militancy effectively in three states-Mizoram, Punjab and Tripura.

In Mizoram when the MNF launched Operation Jericho on February 28, 1966 and captured several places including Aizwal and kept it under their full control for eight days, Indian Airforce was used and the fighters strafed on them. This was, perhaps, for the first time in the world at that time that a country used its air force on its own people. The standard of maintenance of Human Rights by the state authority then thus could very well be guessed. Yet, following several sets of negotiations in various parts of the world ultimately the MNF sat for final peace talks and peace indeed returned in Mizoram in 1986. (Later Sri Lankan authority also used air force on LTTE infested areas to flush them out of Killonecchi, Mullaitivu, and other northern parts of the island nation).

In Punjab the militancy- overtly aided by Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto- was fought ruthlessly and decisively by Punjab police led by KPS Gill. The expression - ‘Human Rights- virtually meant nothing then in Punjab. Excessive forces were used and by hardnosed policing the violence was contained.

But in Tripura though the police took the lead role in combating militancy the Human Rights violations were negligible. Offhand only one or two severe Human Rights violations come to mind - one being the Ujan Maidan in 1989 where tribal women were raped by some Assam Rifles jawans and the other being Kutnabari incident on November 6, 1999 where Tripura State Rifles personnel cold bloodedly killed three tribal youths following an ATTF ambush on their colleagues. Then there were some stray reports of Human Rights violations in Takumbari and Chhankhola areas. But in all the cases authorities took strong view and actions were taken against the erring personnel.

The state forces, while combating the non-state armed actors carrying out violence, are virtually left with only three options: First, arrest them and put them to trial in the court of law, second, force them to surrender under pressure and proactive operations of various kinds and help them start a new life with rehabilitation package, and third when both the first two options fail, engage them in encounter which may result in killing or wounding them.

A fallen body - even if it belongs to an insurgent, or Jihadi or a militant- means the basic of Human Rights of a human being to live a full life is essentially curtailed- even if a man in uniform is forced to do it in an encounter for a greater cause or to save many other innocents. Besides, killing cannot be done with a human face or in other words with sympathy. And this is the tragedy that comes haunting for all the combatants in a conflict zone. This is a fact inherent in Counter Insurgency or Counter terrorist operations.END